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Abstract
We study uniqueness of Nash equilibria in atomic splittable congestion games
and derive a uniqueness result based on polymatroid theory: when the strat-
egy space of every player is a bidirectional flow polymatroid, then equilibria are
unique. Bidirectional flow polymatroids are introduced as a subclass of poly-
matroids possessing certain exchange properties. We show that important cases
such as base orderable matroids can be recovered as a special case of bidirectional
flow polymatroids. On the other hand we show that matroidal set systems are
in some sense necessary to guarantee uniqueness of equilibria: for every atomic
splittable congestion game with at least three players and non-matroidal set sys-
tems per player, there is an isomorphic game having multiple equilibria. Our
results leave a gap between base orderable matroids and general matroids for
which we do not know whether equilibria are unique.
1 Introduction
Congestion games as introduced in Rosenthal [30] constitute an elegant game-theoretic
model describing the distributed allocation of resources among selfish players. Specif-
ically, such a game comprises a finite set of players, a finite set of resources and the
pure strategies of a player are given by a set of allowable subsets of resources. In the
context of network games, the resources may correspond to edges of a graph and the
allowable subsets correspond to paths connecting a source and a sink. Resources have
cost functions that depend on the number of players currently using the resource. For
a given strategy profile (collection of pure strategies of the players), the disutility of
each player is just the sum of resource’ costs of the chosen subset of resources. Rosen-
thal proved in his seminal paper that congestion games always admit a pure Nash
equilibrium.
∗This work is part of the research programme Optimal Coordination Mechanisms for Distributed
Resource Allocation with project number 617.001.302, which is (partly) financed by the Netherlands
Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).
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1.1 Atomic Splittable Congestion Games
Since the initial work of Rosenthal, several works studied related or generalized vari-
ants of congestion games. One such variant that we consider in this paper are so-called
atomic splittable congestion games. In this model, every player has a demand di > 0
that she may split fractionally over the allowable subsets. The cost of a resource is
then a function of the total load assigned to it. This class of games has applications
in modeling packet-routing in communication networks (see Orda et al. [26] and Ko-
rilis et al. [19, 20]), traffic networks (Haurie and Marcotte [17]) and logistics networks
(Cominetti et al. [9]).
Formally, there is a finite set of resources E, a finite set of players N , and each player
i ∈ N is associated with a weight di ≥ 0 and a collection of allowable subsets of
resources Si ⊆ 2E , where 2E denotes the power set of E. A strategy for player i is
then a (possibly fractional) distribution ~xi ∈ R
|Si|
≥0 of the weight over the allowable
subsets S ∈ Si. Thus, one can compactly represent the strategy space of every player
i ∈ N by the following polytope:
Pi := {~xi ∈ R
|Si|
≥0 :
∑
S∈Si
xS = di}. (1)
We denote by ~x = (~xi)i∈N the overall strategy profile. The induced load under ~xi
at e is defined as xi,e :=
∑
S∈Si:e∈S
xS and the total load on e is then given as
xe :=
∑
i∈N xi,e. Resources have player-specific cost functions ci,e : R≥0 → R≥0
which are assumed to be non-negative, increasing, differentiable and convex. The
total cost of player i in strategy distribution ~x is defined as
πi(~x) =
∑
e∈E
ci,e(xe)xi,e.
Each player wants to minimize the total cost on the used resources and a Nash equilib-
rium is a strategy profile ~x from which no player can unilaterally deviate and reduce its
total cost. Using that the strategy space is compact and cost functions are increasing
and convex Kakutanis’ fixed point theorem implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium
[29, Theorem 1].
1.2 Uniqueness of Equilibria
A fundamental property of a strategic game is the uniqueness of equilibria. This
property is key to actually predict the outcome of distributed resource allocation: if
there are multiple equilibria it is not clear upfront which equilibrium will be selected
by the players. This issue has been raised explicitly by Aumann [4] quoted below:
“...it is by no means clear how the players would arrive at an equilibrium, why they
should play equilibrium strategies, and how a specific equilibrium would be chosen
from among the set of all equilibria.”
An intriguing question in the field of atomic splittable congestion games is the possible
non-uniqueness of equilibria.Let ~x and ~y be two equilibria. We say that ~x and ~y are
different whenever there exists a player i and resource e such that xi,e 6= yi,e. A
variant on this question is whether or not there exist multiple equilibria such that
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there exists at least one resource e for which xe 6= ye. We call this variant “uniqueness
up to induced load on the resources”.
For non-atomic players and network congestion games on directed graphs, Milch-
taich [23] proved that Nash equilibria are not unique when cost functions are player-
specific. Uniqueness is only guaranteed if the underlying graph is two terminal s-
t-nearly-parallel. Richman and Shimkin [28] extended this result to hold for atomic
splittable network games. Bhaskar et al. [6] looked at uniqueness up to induced load
on the resources. They proved that even when all players experience the same cost
on a resource, there can exist multiple equilibria. They further proved that for two
players, the Nash equilibrium is unique if and only if the underlying undirected graph
is generalized series-parallel. For multiple players of two types (players are of the same
type if they have the same weight and share the same origin-destination pair), there
is a unique equilibrium if and only if the underlying undirected graph is s-t-series-
parallel. For more than two types of players, there is a unique equilibrium if and only
if the underlying undirected graph is generalized nearly-parallel.
1.3 Our Results and Outline of the Paper
In this paper we study the uniqueness of equilibria for general set systems (Si)i∈N .
Interesting combinatorial structures of the Si’s beyond paths may be trees, forests,
Steiner trees or tours all in a directed or undirected graph or bases of matroids.
As our main result we give a sufficient condition for uniqueness based on the theory
of polymatroids. We show that if the strategy space of every player is a polymatroid
base polytope satisfying a special exchange property – we term this class of polyma-
troids bidirectional flow polymatroids – the equilibria are unique.1 We demonstrate
that bidirectional flow polymatroids are quite general as they contain base-orderable
matroids, gammoids, transversal and laminar matroids. For an overview of special
cases that follow from our main result, see Figure 1.
The uniqueness result is stated in Section 4. In Section 5 we show that base-orderable
matroids are a special case of bidirectional flow polymatroids. Definitions of polyma-
troid congestion games and bidirectional flow polymatroids are introduced in Sections 2
and 3, respectively.
In Section 6 and Section 7 we complement our uniqueness result by showing multiple
equilibria exist when certain assumptions are dropped. In Section 6 we discuss why
it is necesarry for cost functions to be differentiable. In Section 7 we consider a game
with at least three players for which the set systems Si of all players i ∈ N are not
bases of a matroid. Then there exists a game with strategy spaces φ(Si) isomorphic to
Si which admits multiple equilibria. Here, the term isomorphic means that there is no
a priori description on how the individual strategy spaces of players interweave in the
ground set of resources. Our results leave a gap between general matroids and base
orderable matroids for which we do not know whether or not equilibria are unique.
In Section 8 we consider uniqueness of equilibria if the set systems Si correspond to
paths in an undirected graph. The instance used for showing multiplicity of equilibria
of non-matroid games can be seen as a 3-player game played on an undirected 3-
1The formal definition of bidirectional flow polymatroids appears in Def. 3.3.
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Figure 1: Several well-known classes of matroids and the relations between them. Here
GSP is short for generalized series-parallel. References and arguments for the seven
inclusions can be found in Appendix A.
vertex cycle graph. From this we can derive a new characterization of uniqueness of
equilibria in undirected graphs. If we assume at least three players and if we do not
specify beforehand which vertices of the graph serve as sources or sinks, an undirected
graph induces unique equilibria if and only if the graph has no cycle of length at least
3.
1.4 Further Related Work
Atomic splittable (network) congestion games have been first proposed by Orda et
al. [26] and Altman et al. [3] in the context of modeling routing in communication
networks. Other applications include traffic and freight networks (cf. Cominetti et
al. [10]) and scheduling (cf. Huang [18]). Haurie and Marcotte [17] showed that
classical nonatomic congestion games (cf. Beckmann et al. [5] and Wardrop [33]) can
be modeled as atomic splittable congestion games by constructing a sequence of games
and taking the limit with respect to the number of players. It follows that atomic
splittable congestion games are strictly more general as their nonatomic counterpart.
Cominetti et al. [10], Harks [14] and Roughgarden and Schoppmann [31] studied the
price of anarchy in atomic splittable congestion games.
Matroid congestion games were first considered by Ackermann et al. [1, 2]. They
showed that (unsplittable) weighted congestion games possess pure Nash equilibria
even for player-specific nondecreasing cost functions. They also showed that the ma-
troid property is the maximal property that gives rise to a pure Nash equilibrium, that
is, for any strategy space not satisfying the matroid property, there is an instance of a
weighted congestion game not having a pure Nash equilibrium. Integral polymatroid
congestion games, a generalization of matroid congestion games, were later introduced
in Harks, Klimm and Peis [15] (see also [16]). In addition, polymatroid theory was
recently used in the context of nonatomic congestion games, where it is shown that
matroid set systems are immune to the Braess paradox, see Fujishige et al. [12].
2 Polymatroid Congestion Games
In polymatroid congestion games we assume that the strategy space for every player
corresponds to a polymatroid base polytope.
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In order to define polymatroids we first have to introduce submodular functions. A
function ρ : 2E → R is called submodular if ρ(U) + ρ(V ) ≥ ρ(U ∪ V ) + ρ(U ∩ V ) for
all U, V ⊆ E. It is called monotone if ρ(U) ≤ ρ(V ) for all U ⊆ V , and normalized if
ρ(∅) = 0. Given a submodular, monotone and normalized function ρ, the pair (E, ρ)
is called a polymatroid. The associated polymatroid base polytope is defined as:
Pρ :=
{
~x ∈ RE≥0 | x(U) ≤ ρ(U) ∀U ⊆ E, x(E) = ρ(E)
}
,
where x(U) :=
∑
e∈U xe for all U ⊆ E.
In a polymatroid congestion game, we associate with every player i a player-specific
polymatroid (E, ρi) and assume that the strategy space of player i is defined by the
(player-specific) polymatroid base polytope Pρi .
Pρi :=
{
~xi ∈ R
E
≥0 | xi(U) ≤ ρi(U) ∀U ⊆ E, xi(E) = ρi(E)
}
.
From now on, when we mention a polymatroid congestion game, we mean a weighted
atomic splittable polymatroid congestion game. We give three examples of polyma-
troid congestion games:
Example 2.1 (Queueing Games (cf. [19])). Let Q = {q1, . . . qm} be a set of M/M/1
queues served in a first-come-first-served fashion andN = {1, . . . , n} a set of companies
who independently send packets with arrival rates d1, . . . dn. Every queue q has a single
server with exponentially distributed service time with mean 1/µq, where µq > 0. Each
packet is routed to a single server q out of a set of allowable queues, depending on the
company. Given a distribution of packets ~x ∈ Rm≥0, the mean delay of queue q can be
computed as cq(xq) =
1
µq−xq
. In this case the sets Si are uniform rank-1 matroids,
which are also called singleton games.
Example 2.2 (Transversal games). Consider a finite set E of storing facilities, a finite
set A of locations and a finite set N of players. Each player has to store an amount of
di of divisible goods in each area j ∈ A. Each area j can be served from any storing
facility within a given set Sj ⊆ E. The sets Sj may overlap, even for the same player
i. However, due to reliability reasons, a player cannot store more than dj goods in one
storing facility. The cost ci,e for using a specific storing facility depends on the total
amount of goods that have to be stored in storing facility e. The more goods need to
be stored, the larger the cost to use it.
This setting can be modeled as a bipartite graph G on vertex sets E and A, where
an edge between area j ∈ A and storage facility e ∈ E exists if and only if area j can
be served from storage facility e. In a feasible strategy a player divides its goods over
bases of the transversal matroid of this graph: subsets of storage facilities that are
the endpoints of a maximal matching in G. Hence, the strategy space of every player
i ∈ N corresponds to the base polytope Pdi·rki , where rki is the rank function of a
transversal matroid.
Example 2.3 (Matroid Congestion Games). A matroid M is a pair (E, I), where E
is a finite set of resources and I is a family of subsets of E, called the independent
sets. Set I has the following three properties:
1. The empty set is an independent set: ∅ ∈ I.
5
2. Set I is closed under taking subsets: if I ⊆ J and J ∈ I, then I ∈ I.
3. Set I has the exchange property: if I, J ∈ I and |I| < |J |, then there exists an
e ∈ J such that I ∪ {e} ∈ I.
A basis is an independent set that becomes dependent on adding any element of E.
The base set B contains all bases of (E, I).
Consider an atomic splittable matroid congestion model, where for every i ∈ N the
allowable subsets are the base set Bi of a matroid Mi = (E, Ii). The rank function
rki : 2
E → R of matroid Mi is defined as: rki(S) := max{|U | | U ⊆ S and U ∈ Ii}
for all S ⊆ E, and is submodular, monotone and normalized [27]. Moreover, the
characteristic vectors of the bases in Bi are exactly the vertices of the polymatroid
base polytope Prki . It follows that the polytope Pi := {~x ∈ R
|Bi|
≥0 |
∑
B∈Bi
xB =
di} corresponds to strategy distributions that lead to load vectors in the following
polytope:
Pdi·rki =
{
~xi ∈ R
E
≥0|xi(U) ≤ di · rki(U) ∀U ⊆ E, xi(E) = di · rki(E)
}
.
Hence matroid congestion models are a special case of polymatroid congestion models.
Both the singleton games in Example 2.1 and the transversal games in Example 2.2
are a special case of matroid congestion games.
3 Bidirectional Flow Polymatroids
We provide a sufficient condition for a class of polymatroid congestion games to have
a unique Nash equilibrium. We prove that if the strategy space of every player is
the base polytope of a bidirectional flow polymatroid, Nash equilibria are unique. In
order to define the class of bidirectional flow polymatroids we first discuss some basic
properties of polymatroids. We start with a generalization of the strong exchange
property for matroids. Let χe ∈ Z
|E| be the characteristic vector with χe(e) = 1, and
χe(e
′) = 0 for all e′ 6= e.
Lemma 3.1 (Strong exchange property polymatroids (Murota [24])). Let Pρ be a
polymatroid base polytope defined on (E, ρ). Let ~x, ~y ∈ Pρ and suppose xe > ye for
some e ∈ E. Then there exists an e′ ∈ E with xe′ < ye′ and an ǫ > 0 such that:
~x+ ǫ(χe′ − χe) ∈ Pρ and ~y + ǫ(χe − χe′) ∈ Pρ.
This exchange property will play an important role in the definition of bidirectional
flow polymatroids. Given a strategy ~x in the base polytope of polymatroid (E, ρ),
we are interested in the exchanges that can be made between xe and xe′ for some
resources in e, e′ ∈ E. For that, we define a directed exchange graph D(~x) =
(E, V ), where the set of vertices equals the set of resources E. The edge set is
V := {(e, e′)|∃ ǫ > 0 such that ~x+ ǫ(χe′ − χe) ∈ Pρ}. We define exchange capacities
cˆ~x(e, e
′) (following notation of Fujishige [11]), which denotes the maximal amount of
load that can be exchanged in ~x between resources e and e′. More formally:
cˆ~x(e, e
′) := max{α|~x+ α(χe′ − χe) ∈ Pρ}.
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We use Lemma 3.1 to prove the following:
Lemma 3.2. Let Pρ be a polymatroid base polytope defined on (E, ρ). For ~x, ~y ∈ Pρ,
there exists a flow in D(~x) satisfying all supplies and demands, where a resource e
with xe > ye has supply of xe − ye and e with xe < ye has a demand of ye − xe.
Proof. Consider the following algorithm:
1. Let f be the zero flow, a flow where we send zero flow along all edges in D(~x).
2. If ~x = ~y, then stop and output flow f .
3. Choose any element e ∈ E such that xe > ye.
4. Use Lemma 3.1 to find e′ ∈ E such that xe′ < ye′ and ǫ > 0 with
~x+ ǫ(χe′ − χe) ∈ Pρ and ~y + ǫ(χe − χe′) ∈ Pρ.
Put α = min {cˆ~x(e, e
′), cˆ~y(e
′, e), xe − ye, ye′ − xe′}, define ~y ← ~y + α(χe − χe′)
and add α flow to edge (e, e′) in flow f .
5. If α < xe − ye, then go to step 4. Otherwise (α = xe − ye), go to step 2.
Note that this algorithm is a slightly changed version of Fujishige [11, Theorem 3.27].
The only difference is that we do not change y to x with exchanges that only can
be made on strategy ~y (which is proven in Fujishige [11, Theorem 3.27]) but with
exchanges that can be executed on both ~x and ~y. As these exchanges always exists,
the results by Fujishige [11, Theorem 3.27] are still valid for our algorithm. Hence,
this algorithm transforms ~y into ~x with at most ⌊|E|2/4⌋ elementary transformations
described in Lemma 3.1, such that each component ye with ye < xe monotonically
increases and each component ye with ye > xe monotonically decreases. Therefore f
satisfies all supplies and demands as described in the lemma. Flow f also satisfies all
capacity constraints, as every pair of resources (e, e′) is considered at most once, and
all exchanges can be done on ~x. Hence f(e,e′) ≤ cˆ~x(e, e
′), thus f is a flow in D(~x)
satisfying all supplies and demands.
The flow f mentioned in Lemma 3.2 is a flow from the perspective of strategy ~x and
therefore we call this a directed flow. In the following we define a bidirectional flow.
Let Pρ again be a polymatroid base polytope on set E. For any ~x, ~y ∈ Pρ define the
capacitated graph D(~x, ~y) on vertices E. An edge (e, e′) exist if there is an ǫ > 0 such
that ~x+ ǫ(χ′e−χe) ∈ Pρ and ~y+ ǫ(χe−χ
′
e) ∈ Pρ. For edges (e, e
′) we define capacities
cˆ~x,~y(e, e
′) as follows:
cˆ~x,~y(e, e
′) := max{α|~x+ α(χe′ − χe) ∈ Pρ and ~y + α(χe − χ
′
e) ∈ Pρ}
A bidirectional flow is a flow in D(~x, ~y) where every resource e with xe > ye has supply
of xe − ye and every resource e with xe < ye has a demand of ye − xe. Such a flow
might not exist. In that case we say that ~x and ~y are conflicting strategies.
We are ready to define the class of bidirectional flow polymatroids :
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Definition 3.3 (Bidirectional flow polymatroid). A polymatroid (E, ρ) is called a
bidirectional flow polymatroid if for every pair of vectors ~x, ~y in the base polytope Pρ,
there exists a bidirectional flow in D(~x, ~y).
We give a simple example of a bidirectional flow polymatroid.
Example 3.4. We consider polymatroid Pρ defined by the graphic matroid on the
graph depicted in Figure 2. In this polymatroid, a total load of 1 is divided over
the bases of the graphic matroid. Here, for any two strategies ~x and ~y there exists a
bidirectional flow in D(~x, ~y). In particular, in Figure 3 we show the existance for a
bidirectional flow for strategy ~x and ~y defined in Figure 2.
1 2
3 4
5
1 1
1
1
1 1
Figure 2: Left: the original graph with numbered resources. Middle: Load distribution
for strategy ~x. Right: Load distribution for strategy ~y.
4 3
5
1
2
1
11
-1 -1
1
0
1
11
Figure 3: Left: Graph D(~x, ~y) with corresponding capacities. Right: the bidirectional
flow in D(~x, ~y), including supplies and demands.
4 A Uniqueness Result
In this section we prove that when the strategy space of every player is the base
polytope of a bidirectional flow polymatroid, equilibria are unique. We denote the
marginal cost of player i on resource e ∈ E by µi,e(~x) = ci,e(xe) + xi,ec′i,e(xe).
An equilibrium condition for polymatroid congestion games, a result that follows
from [14, Lemma 1], is as follows:
Lemma 4.1. Let ~x be a Nash equilibrium in a polymatroid congestion game. If xi,e >
0, then for all e′ ∈ E for which there is an ǫ > 0 such that ~xi + ǫ(χe′ − χe) ∈ Pρi , we
have µi,e(~x) ≤ µi,e′(~x).
In the rest of this section we will prove the following theorem:
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Theorem 4.2. If for a polymatroid congestion game, the strategy space for every
player is the base polytope of a bidirectional flow polymatroid, then the equilibria of
this game are unique.
From now on we assume ~x = (~xi)i∈N and ~y = (~yi)i∈N are strategy profiles, where
strategies ~xi and ~yi are taken from the base polytope Pρi of a player-specific bidirec-
tional flow polymatroid. Before we prove Theorem 4.2, we first introduce some new no-
tation. We defineE+ = {e ∈ E|xe > ye} andE− = {e ∈ E|xe < ye} as the sets of glob-
ally overloaded and underloaded resources. Define E= = {e ∈ E|xe = ye} as the set of
resources on which the total load does not change. In the same way we define player-
specific sets of locally underloaded and overloaded resourcesEi,+ = {e ∈ E|xi,e > yi,e}
and Ei,− = {e ∈ E|xi,e < yi,e}. We also introduce four player sets:
N+> = {i ∈ N |
∑
e∈E+
xi,e − yi,e > 0}, N
−
> = {i ∈ N |
∑
e∈E−∪E=
xi,e − yi,e > 0},
N+< = {i ∈ N |
∑
e∈E+
xi,e − yi,e ≤ 0}, N
−
< = {i ∈ N |
∑
e∈E−∪E=
xi,e − yi,e ≤ 0}.
We can distinguish between two cases. Either E = E=, thus xe = ye for all resources
e ∈ E, or E 6= E=, which implies that E+ and E− are non-empty.
Lemma 4.3. If E 6= E=, then N+> 6= ∅.
Proof. Every player distributes the same weight over the resources in ~xi and ~yi, thus∑
e∈E xi,e − yi,e = 0 and N
+
> = N
−
< and N
+
< = N
−
> . As E
+ 6= ∅ we have:
0 <
∑
e∈E+
xe − ye =
∑
i∈N+>
∑
e∈E+
xi,e − yi,e +
∑
i∈N+<
∑
e∈E+
xi,e − yi,e.
Note that the first term in the last expression is non-negative and the second one is
non-positive. As the whole equation should be positive, we need that this first term
is strictly positive and therefore N+> 6= ∅.
For each player i we create a graph G(~xi, ~yi) from graph D(~xi, ~yi) by adding a super-
source si and a super-sink ti to D(~xi, ~yi). We add edges from si to e ∈ Ei,+ with
capacity xi,e − yi,e and edges from e ∈ Ei,− to ti with capacity yi,e − xi,e. Graph
G(~xi, ~yi)= (VG, EG) is visualized in Figure 4.
Recall that strategies ~xi and ~yi are both chosen from the base polytope of a bidi-
rectional flow polymatroid. Therefore there exists a flow fi in D(~xi, ~yi) where every
resource e ∈ Ei,+ has a supply of xi,e − yi,e and e ∈ Ei,− a demand of yi,e − xi,e.
Using fi we define a flow f
′
i in G(~xi, ~yi) as follows:
f ′i(e, e
′) =


xi,e − yi,e, if e = si and e′ ∈ Ei,+,
yi,e − xi,e, if e ∈ E
i,− and e′ = ti,
fi(e, e
′), otherwise.
(2)
Lemma 4.4. There exists a player i and a path (si, e1, . . . , ek, ti) in G(~xi, ~yi) such
that e1 ∈ Ei,+ ∩ (E+ ∪E=) and ek ∈ Ei,− ∩ (E− ∪ E=).
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si
e1
ek
ti
Ei,+ Ei,−
Cut δ(E+)
Figure 4: Visualization of graph G(~xi, ~yi) and cut δ(E
+) used in the proof of Lemma
4.4.
Proof. If E 6= E=, then using Lemma 4.3 we have that N+> 6= ∅, and we pick a
player i ∈ N+> . Flow f
′
i can be decomposed into flow carrying si-ti paths, and
we will show that there exists a path in this path decomposition that goes from
si to a vertex e1 ∈ Ei,+ ∩ E+, and, after visiting possibly other vertices, finally
goes through a vertex ek ∈ E
i,− ∩ (E− ∪ E=) to ti. To see this consider the cut
δ(E+) := {(u, v) ∈ EG | u ∈ E+ and v /∈ E+, or u /∈ E+ and v ∈ E+)}, as visualized
in Figure 4. Recall that i ∈ N+> , hence,
∑
e∈E+ xi,e − yi,e > 0. Thus, in f
′
i more load
enters E+ from si, than leaves E
+ to ti. This implies that in the flow decomposition
of f ′i there must be a path that goes from si to a vertex e1 ∈ E
i,+ ∩ E+, crosses cut
δ(E+) an odd number of times to a vertex ek ∈ Ei,− ∩ (E− ∪E=) before ending in ti.
As this is a flow-carrying path in f ′i , it exists in G(~xi, ~yi).
If E = E=, pick any player i for which there exists a resource e with xi,e 6= yi,e and look
at the path decomposition of f ′i . Every path (si, e1, . . . , ek, ti) in this decomposition is
a path such that e1 ∈ Ei,+ and ek ∈ Ei,−. AsE = E=, it also holds that e1 ∈ Ei,+∩E=
and ek ∈ Ei,− ∩ E=. As this is a flow-carrying path in f ′i , it exists in G(~xi, ~yi)
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Assume ~x and ~y are both Nash equilibria. Using Lemma 4.4
we find a path (si, e1, . . . , ek, ti) in G(~xi, ~yi) such that e1 ∈ Ei,+ ∩ (E+ ∪ E=) and
ek ∈ E
i,− ∩ (E− ∪ E=). Since every edge (ej , ej+1) exists in G(~xi, ~yi), for all j ∈
{1, . . . , k − 1} we get for sufficiently small ǫ > 0:
~xi + ǫ(χej+1 − χej ) ∈ Pρi and ~yi + ǫ(χej − χej+1 ) ∈ Pρi .
Using Lemma 4.1 we obtain for ~x:
µi,e1(~x) ≤ µi,e2(~x) ≤ · · · ≤ µi,ek(~x), (3)
and similarly for ~y:
µi,ek(~y) ≤ µi,ek−1 (~y) ≤ · · · ≤ µi,e1 (~y). (4)
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Recall that µi,e(~x) = ci,e(xe) + xi,ec
′
i,e(xe). As e1 ∈ E
i,+, we have that xi,e1 > yi,e1 .
Because ci,e1 is strictly increasing and e1 ∈ (E
+ ∪ E=) we get ci,e1(xe1 ) ≥ ci,e1(ye1)
and c′i,e1(xe1 ) > 0 using xe1 ≥ xi,e1 > 0. Moreover, since ci,e1 is convex, the slope of
ci,e1 is non-decreasing and, hence, c
′
i,e1
(xe1 ) ≥ c
′
i,e1
(ye1). Putting things together, we
get
µi,e1(~y) < µi,e1(~x). (5)
Similarly, as ek ∈ Ei,− ∩ (E− ∪E=), we have:
µi,ek(~x) ≤ µi,ek(~y). (6)
Combining (3), (4), (5) and (6), we have:
µi,ek(~x) ≤ µi,ek(~y) ≤ µi,e1(~y) < µi,e1(~x) ≤ µi,ek(~x).
This is a contradiction and therefore either strategy ~xi or ~yi is not a Nash equilibrium
for player i.
5 Applications
In this section we demonstrate that bidirectional flow polymatroids are general enough
to allow for meaningful applications. As described in Example 2.3, matroid congestion
games belong to polymatroid congestion games. A subclass of matroids are base
orderable matroids introduced by Brualdi [7] and Brualdi and Scrimger [8].
Definition 5.1 (Base orderable matroid). A matroid M = (E, I) is called base order-
able if for every pair of bases (B,B′) there exists a bijective function gB,B′ : B → B
′
such that both B − e+ gB,B′(e) ∈ B and B′ + e− gB,B′(e) ∈ B for all e ∈ E.
We prove that polymatroids defined by the rank function of a base orderable matroid
belong to the class of bidirectional flow polymatroids. Therefore, all matroid con-
gestion games for which the player-specific matroids are base orderable have unique
equilibria.
Theorem 5.2. Let rk be the rank function of a base orderable matroid M = (E, rk).
Then, for any d ≥ 0, the polymatroid (E, d · rk) is a bidirectional flow polymatroid.
Proof. Similar as in Example 2.3, polytope P describes how weight d can be divided
over bases in B to obtain a feasible strategy ~x ∈ Pd·rk. We call vector ~x′ ∈ P a base
decomposition of ~x if it satisfies xe =
∑
B∈B;e∈B x
′
B for all e ∈ E. Note that a base
composition of ~x ∈ Pd·rk always exists, as Pd·rk is the convex hull of all characteristic
vectors (multiplied by d) of all the bases of matroidM (see [11, Corollary 3.25]). Given
two vectors ~x, ~y ∈ Pd·rk, we look at the differences between two base decompositions
~x′, ~y′ ∈ P . We introduce sets B+,B− ⊂ B that will contain respectively the overloaded
and underloaded bases : B+ = {B ∈ B|x′B > y
′
B} and B
− = {B ∈ B|x′B < y
′
B}.
Using these sets we create the complete directed bipartite graph DB(~x, ~y) on vertices
(B+,B−), where basesB ∈ B+ have a supply x′B−y
′
B and basesB ∈ B
− have a demand
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y′B − x
′
B. As the total supply equals the total demand, there exists a transshipment t
from strategies B ∈ B+ to strategies B′ ∈ B−, such that, when carried out, we obtain
~y′ from ~x′. We denote by t(B,B′) the amount of load transshipped from B ∈ B
+ to
B′ ∈ B−.
In the remainder of the proof, we use transshipment t to construct a flow f in graph
D(~x, ~y). As the polymatroid is defined by the rank function of a base orderable
matroid, for every pair of bases (B,B′) there exists a bijective function gB,B′ : B → B′
such that both B − e + gB,B′(e) ∈ B and B
′ + e − gB,B′(e) ∈ B for all e ∈ B. Note
that when e ∈ B ∩ B′, gB,B′(e) = e. Using the function gB,B′ , we can decompose
the value transshipped from B to B′ into a transshipment between resources. For all
combinations of resources (e, e′) ∈ E × E we define:
B2e,e′ :=
{
(B,B′) ∈ B+ × B−|e ∈ B, e′ ∈ B′ and gB,B(e) = e
′
}
.
We define flow f as: f(e,e′) =
∑
(B,B′)∈B2
e,e′
tB,B′ for all (e, e
′) ∈ E × E. Then f has
the following two properties:
1. It satisfies all demands and supplies in D(~x, ~y) as f is created from base decom-
positions ~x′, ~y′ for strategy profiles ~x and ~y.
2. It satisfies capacities cˆ~x,~y(e, e
′) of D(~x, ~y), as ~x+
∑
(B,B′)∈B2
e,e′
tB,B′ · (χe′ − χe)
is a convex combination of bases, and thus an element of Pd·rk. Therefore,
f(e,e′) =
∑
(B,B′)∈B2
e,e′
tB,B′ < cˆ~x,~y(e, e
′).
Hence, f is a feasible flow in D(~x, ~y), satisfying all supplies and demands. As ~x, ~y ∈
Pd·rk were chosen arbitrarily, Pd·rk is a bidirectional flow polymatroid.
An application of these results can be found in the spanning tree games.
Example 5.3 (Spanning Tree Games). Consider a finite set of players N = {1, . . . n}
and an undirected graph G = (V,E) with non-negative, increasing, differentiable,
convex and player specific edge costs functions ci,e for all e ∈ E and i ∈ N . In a
spanning tree game, every player i is associated with a weight di and a subgraph Gi
of G. A strategy for player i is to divide it’s weight along the spanning trees of Gi, to
minimize his total costs. If G is a generalized series parallel graph, then Pdi·rki is a
bidirectional flow polymatroid, where rki be the rank function for the graphic matroid
on subgraph Gi, (cf. Figure 1). Theorem 5.2 implies that equilibria will be unique.
For graphic matroids, the generalized series-parallel graph is the maximal graph struc-
ture that allows for a bidirectional flow between every pair of strategies.
Theorem 5.4 (Korneyenko [21], Nishizeki [25]). A graph is generalized series-parallel
if and only if it does not contain the K4 as a minor.
Let rk be the rank function for the graphic matroid on the K4, we show that there
exist two conflicting strategies ~x, ~y ∈ Prk, thus there does not exist a flow f in D(~x, ~y).
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Example 5.5. Polymatroid (E, rk) based on the rank function of the graphic matroid
on the K4 is not a bidirectional flow polymatroid. Let the resources be numbered as
in Figure 5 and look at the strategies ~x = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1) and ~y = (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0).
Graph D(~x, ~y) is depicted in Figure 5. Then there is no flow f in D(~x, ~y) that satisfies
all supplies and demands. Resource 1 and 6 have both a supply of 1 and can only
exchange load with resource 4 , which only has demand 1. Thus such a flow f does
not exist, and (E, rk) is not a bidirectional flow polymatroid.
1
2
6
3
4
5
1
23
4 5
6
Figure 5: Left: the K4 with two strategies ~x (thick), ~y (dashed). Right: D(~x, ~y).
6 Non-differentiable Convex Functions
So far we assumed cost functions to be differentiable. When this is not the case, the
proof we gave in the previous section won’t hold. When a function is not differentiable,
one speaks about the left derivative c−(x) and the right derivative c+(x). In the same
way we define µ−i,e(~x) = c(xe) + xi,ec
−(xe) and µ
+
i,e(~x) = c(xe) + xi,ec
+(xe). For
non-differentiable functions, equilibrium condition 4.1 generalizes as follows:
Lemma 6.1 (Theorem 8.1, [11]). Let ~x be a Nash equilibrium in a polymatroid con-
gestion game. If xi,e > 0, then for all e
′ ∈ E for which there is an ǫ > 0 such that
~xi + ǫ(χe′ − χe) ∈ Pρi , we have µ
−
i,e(~x) ≤ µ
+
i,e′ (~x).
The uniqueness proof in the previous section will not hold as equations (5) and (6)
might fail to hold using this new equilibrium condition. An example with multiple
equilibria is as follows.
Example 6.2. We look at a two player asymmetric game on three resources. Both
players have equal weight 1, and the first player can only use resource 1 or 2, the
second player can only use resource 2 or 3. Note that this game is a 1-uniform matroid
congestion, and therefore a bidirectional polymatroid. We use the following non-player
specific cost functions:
c1(x1) = 4x1 c2(x2) =
{
x2 if x2 < 1
10x2 − 9 otherwise
c3(x3) = 4x3.
Let (x1,1, x1,2, x2,2, x2,3) denote a game. Then both (
1
3 ,
2
3 ,
1
3 ,
2
3 ) and (
2
3 ,
1
3 ,
2
3 ,
1
3 ) cor-
respond to Nash equilibria. Note that these are two Nash equilibria where the total
load on the resources differ.
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The same example can be modified for one with symmetric strategy spaces, but player
specific costs, by incurring a high cost on the unavailable resources. The question
remains unresolved for symmetric player specific cost functions.
7 Non-Matroid Set Systems
We now derive necessary conditions on a given set system (Si)i∈N so that any atomic
splittable congestion game based on (Si)i∈N admits unique equilibria. We show that
the matroid property is a necessary condition on the players’ strategy spaces that
guarantees uniqueness of equilibria without taking into account how the strategy spaces
of different players interweave.2 To state this property mathematically precisely, we
introduce the notion of embeddings of Si in E. An embedding is a map τ := (τi)i∈N ,
where every τi : Ei → E is an injective map from Ei := ∪S∈SiS to E. For X ⊆ Ei,
we denote τi(X) := {τi(e), e ∈ X}. Mapping τi induces an isomorphism φτi : Si → S
′
i
with S 7→ τi(S) and S ′i := {τi(S)|S ∈ Si}. Isomorphism φτ = (φτi)i∈N induces the
isomorphic strategy space φτ (S) = (φτi(Si))i∈N .
Definition 7.1. A family of set systems Si ⊆ 2Ei , for i ∈ N is said to have the
strong uniqueness property if for all embeddings τ , the induced game with isomorphic
strategy space φτ (S) has unique Nash equilibria.
Since for bases of matroids any embedding τi with isomorphism φτi has the prop-
erty that φτi(Si) is again a collection of bases of a matroid, we obtain the following
immediate consequence of Theorem 4.2.
Corollary 7.2. If (Si)i∈N consists of bases of a base-orderable matroid Mi = (E, Ii),
i ∈ N , then (Si)i∈N possess the strong uniqueness property.
For obtaining necessary conditions we need a certain property of non-matroids stated
in the following lemma.
Lemma 7.3. [2, Lemma 16] If Si ⊆ 2Ei with Si 6= ∅ is a non-matroid, then there
exist X,Y ∈ Si and {a, b, c} ⊆ X∆Y := (X \ Y ) ∪ (Y \ X) such that for each set
Z ∈ Si with Z ⊆ X ∪ Y , either a ∈ Z or {b, c} ⊆ Z.
Theorem 7.4. Let |N | ≥ 3 and assume that for all i ∈ N , Si is a non-matroid set
system. Then, (Si)i∈N does not have the strong uniqueness property.
Proof. We will show that there are embeddings τi : Ei → E, i ∈ N , such that the
isomorphic game φτ (S) = (φτ1(S1), . . . , φτn(Sn)) admits multiple equilibria.
We can assume w.l.o.g. that each set system Si forms an anti-chain (in the sense that
X ∈ Si, X ⊂ Y implies Y 6∈ Si) since cost functions are non-negative and strictly
increasing. Let us call a non-empty set system Si ⊆ 2Ei a non-matroid if Si is an
anti-chain and (Ei, {X ⊆ S : S ∈ Si}) is not a matroid.
Let E˜ =
⋃
i∈N τi(Ei) denote the set of all resources under the embeddings τi, i ∈ N .
The costs on all resources in E˜ \ (τ1(E1) ∪ τ2(E2) ∪ τ3(E3)) are set to zero. Also, the
2The term “interweaving” has been introduced by Ackermann et al. [1, 2].
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Table 1: Cost functions used for constructing a game with multiple equilibria.
e f g
Player 1 c1,e(x) = x
3 c1,f (x) = x+ 1 c1,g(x) = x+ 1
Player 2 c2,e(x) = x+ 1 c2,f (x) = x
3 c2,g(x) = x+ 1
Player 3 c3,e(x) = x+ 1 c3,f (x) = x+ 1 c3,g(x) = x
3
demands of all players di with i ∈ N \ {1, 2, 3} are set to zero. This way, the game is
basically determined by the players 1, 2, 3. We set the demands d1 = d2 = d3 = 1.
Let us choose two sets X,Y in S1 and {a, b, c} ⊆ X ∪ Y as described in Lemma 7.3.
Let e := τ1(a), f := τ1(b) and g := τ1(c). We set the costs of all resources in τ1(E1) \
(τ1(X) ∪ τ1(Y )) to some very large cost M (large enough so that player 1 would never
use any of these resources). The cost on all resources in (τ1(X) ∪ τ1(Y )) \ {e, f, g}
is set to zero. This way, player 1 always chooses a strategy τ1(Z) ⊆ τ1(X) ∪ τ1(Y )
which, by Lemma 7.3, either contains e, or it contains both f and g. We apply the
same construction for player 2 and 3, only changing the role of e to act as f and g,
respectively.
Note that the so-constructed game is essentially isomorphic to the routing game illus-
trated in Figure 6 if we interpret resource e as arc (s1, t1), resource f as arc (s2, t2),
and resource g as arc (s3, t3). On every edge there is a player specific cost function,
given in Table 1.
Every player has two possible paths: the direct path that uses only one edge, or the
indirect path that uses two edges. We show that the game where everyone puts all
their weight on the direct path is a Nash equilibrium, as is the game where everybody
puts their weight on the indirect path.
s1, t3
s2, t1
s3, t2
e
f
g
Figure 6: Counterexample
If all players put their weight on the direct route, then player 1 cannot deviate to
decrease it’s costs, as:
c1,e(1) + c
′
1,e(1) · 1 = 1 + 3 ≤ 2 + 2 = c1,f(1) + c1,g(1).
On the other hand, when all players put their weight on the indirect direct route,
player 1 can also not deviate, as:
c1,f (2) + c
′
1,f(2) · 1 + c1,g(2) + c
′
1,g(2) · 1 = 3 + 1 + 3 + 1 ≤ 8 = c1,e(2).
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Table 2: Cost functions for a game with multiple equilibria, M is sufficiently large.
ci,e(x) (v1, v2) (v2, v3) C \ {(v1, v2), (v2, v3)} e /∈ C
Player 1 x3 x+ 1 1
k−2 (x+ 1) x+M
Player 2 x+ 1 x3 1
k−2 (x+ 1) x+M
Player 3 x+ 1 x+ 1 1
k−2 x
3 x+M
The same inequalities hold for player 2 and 3. And therefore everyone playing the
direct route, or everyone playing the indirect route both results in a Nash equilibrium.
8 A Characterization for Undirected Graphs
In Section 7 we proved that non-matroid set systems in general do not have the strong
uniqueness property when there are at least three players, by constructing embeddings
τi that lead to the counterexample in Figure 6. This example also gives new insights
in uniqueness of equilibria in network congestion games. In the following, we give
a characterization of graphs that guarantee uniqueness of Nash equilibria even when
player-specific cost functions are allowed.
Definition 8.1. An undirected graph G is said to have the uniqueness property if for
any atomic splittable network congestion game on G = (V,E), equilibria are unique.
Note that in the above definition, we do not specify how source- and sink vertices are
distributed in V . We obtain the following result which is related to Theorem 3 of
Meunier and Pradeau [22], where a similar result is given for non-atomic congestion
games with player-specific cost functions.
Theorem 8.2. An undirected graph has the uniqueness property if and only if G has
no cycle of length 3 or more.
Proof. Let G = (V,E) be the network in an atomic splittable network congestion
game. Assume there exists a cycle C in G of length k, with k ≥ 3. Already for three
players, we can create a game with multiple equilibria by generalizing the previous
example visualized in Figure 6. Pick three clockwise adjacent vertices v1, v2, v3 in
cycle C and create three players which have equal weight 1. Player 1 has source v1
and sink v2, player 2 has source v2 and sink v3 and player 3 has source v3 and sink v1.
Let ci,e(x) be the cost function for player i at resource e. Define ci,e(x) as in Table 2.
For the same reason as in Example 6 this game has two Nash equilibria: one where
all players send their flow clockwise, another where all players send all flow counter-
clockwise.
On the other hand, assume no cycle of length 3 or more in G exists, then G is a tree
with parallel edges. Thus, for every source s and sink t, there is a unique path from
s to t in G modulo parallel edges. Therefore, players only have to decide on how to
divide their weight over every set of parallel edges they encounter. As the total cost
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for a player is just the sum of the costs for all resources separately, players compete
only in sets of parallel edges. Atomic splittable congestion games on parallel edges
with player-specific cost functions are proven to have a unique Nash equilibrium by
Orda et al. [26]. Thus when G does not contain cycles of length 3 or more, Nash
equilibria are unique.
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A Subclasses of base orderable matroids
We give proofs of the inclusions given in Figure 1:
⊂1: A uniform matroid is a partition matroid where the partition contains only
one set.
⊂2: A partition matroid is a laminar matroid if all sets in the laminar family are
disjoint.
⊂3: A partition matroid is a transversal matroid where the sets that need to be
traversed are either equal or disjoint.
⊂4: For the laminar matroid, let F be the underlying laminar family on ground
set S with S ∈ F . Copy each set X in F exactly kX times to create multi
set F ′, where kX is the number of elements we are allowed to take from
set X . Now create a directed graph G = (V,A), where V = F ′ ∪ S, and
A = {(X,Y ) ∈ F ′ × F ′|X ⊆ Y } ∪ {(s,X) ∈ S × F ′|s ∈ X}. Let U be the
maximal multi set containing only S. Then clearly G with starting points S
and endpoints U form a gammoid that corresponds to the laminar matroid.
⊂5: A transversal matroid is a gammoid according to Corollary 39.5a in [32].
⊂6: Every binary matroid is a gammoid if and only if it is a graphic matroid on a
generalized series-parallel graph [34]. As every graphic matroid is binary [13],
the graphic matroid on a generalized series-parallel graph is a binary gam-
moid, and thus a gammoid.
⊂7: A gammoid is strongly base orderable according to Theorem 42.12 in [32].
⊂8: A matroid M = (R, I) is called strongly base orderable (SBO) if for every
pair of bases (B,B′) there exists a bijective function g : B → B′ such that
B −X + g(X) ∈ B. Take X = e and X = B \ {e} to obtain the conditions
for base orderable matroids.
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